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LET'S MAKE THE LAW UNIFORM!
A Plea for Uniformity in State Securities Laws and
Regulations
By HON. SEYMOUR M. HEILBRON, EsQ., Securities

A

Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

SHARP, shrill whistle of incredulous surprise is raised

from his quivering lips. And then he falls over into a
dead faint.
You have just finished informing him that he will not
be permitted to sell shares of stock in his company until he
registers under the State Securities Act. But this is not the
reason for the whistle nor the faint. These phenomena evidencing the subject's condition of prostrate unbelief and surprise have been caused by your frankness in imparting to him
the further painful information that methodical examination
must be pursued-carefully and without haste. This will
take time.
And this he doesn't like! He recovers from his faint.
He is not so easily downed, you see, and his shocked surprise
gives way to protesting indignation. "Why, this is preposterous," he says, "we encountered no silly delay of this kind in
Nevada !"
The latter part of this statement is doubtless true, inasmuch as there is no securities regulation and no "Blue Sky"
law in Nevada. However, he might just as easily refer to
some other state having a Blue Sky Law and in which state
he has qualified his stock under some provision of the law
which enabled him to evade an exhaustive examination of him
and his plan and to avoid the consumption of time necessary
for it. The overwhelming majority of states have laws regulating securities transactions but there is little uniformity
among them. Similarity there is between some but others
more than make up for this by the contrary divergence between them on matters of procedure and requirement alike.
The first of these so-called "Blue Sky" laws was enacted in
Kansas in 1911. They are popularly known as "Blue Sky"
laws because an early decision of the courts characterized certain securities transactions as "speculative schemes that have
no more basis than so many feet of blue sky." (Hall vs.
Geiger-Jones, 242 U. S. 339.)
16
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The District of Columbia, together with the State of
Nevada, already mentioned, are still without legislation specifically controlling the business of dealing in securities. This,
however, does not mean that the balance of the states are bulwarked with adequate laws covering this field. Delaware,
Maryland, New Jersey and New York take care of this subject, if it can be said to be cared for in such fashion, by the
enforcement of fraud acts, which are punitive, rather than
preventive. We with Blue Sky protection call it "locking the
stable after the horse is stolen."
In the testimony taken before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives
of the 73rd Congress, we find upon page ninety-eight of the
first session, the following classification of the securities laws
of the states:
They roughly fall into two classes:
"1.

Fraud laws, such as exist in three states* and which are not

set in motion until evidence is presented that fraud in the sale of securities has been or is about to be committed.
"2.
Regulatory laws existing in forty-three states, which attempt
to regulate the traffic in securities by forbidding their sale, until an application has been filed and permission granted by the State. This type of
law may be further classified as follows:
"(a)
Dealer-licensing laws, which seek to exercise the desired
control through dealers, by requiring that they obtain licenses under
which they are held responsible for fraud or gross negligence in their
transactions.
"(b)
Specific issue-permit laws, which prohibit the sale of any
security unless a permit has been granted by the State for the sale of each
specific issue. Such permits are granted only after the applicant has
filed more or less detailed information concerning the issue offered.
"This group of regulatory laws may be further subdivided, in
accordance with their classification of securities, as follows:
"1.
Speculative laws which treat all securities as either 'speculative' or 'non-speculative' and apply the provisions of the statutes to
speculative issues only.
"2.
The typical blue-sky laws that divide securities into several

different groups, exempting the sounder issues and applying the regulations to others.

Some transactions also, such as judicial sales, isolated

sales by individuals, and sales to satisfy mortgages, are usually exempted."
The writer cannot agree with the statement made by
Lasser and Gerardi in their book "Federal Securities Act Pro*Actually four states, as above recited.
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cedure" (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934), which says
that Federal legislation was needed to come to the rescue of
the states because "State laws had failed to curb the distribution of unsound securities * * *." The authors hold that
such condition was "attributable to a number of facts which
may be summarized as follows:
(a)
Absence of protective securities legislation in certain states
and inadequate legislation in others.
(b) Lack of uniformity in the laws of the various states.
(c) Willingness of victims to condone the offense or accept a
compromise.
(d) Evasions possible by conducting sales on an interstate basis.

While disagreeing with the premise, it must be admitted
that these above enumerated handicaps do exist and must be
recognized, and must be remedied where they can. True it is
that the scope of the Federal Acts cannot encompass that of
the states. Nevertheless, such an indifferent shrugging of the
shoulders on the part of the states does not make toward the
achievement of the common goal-that of protection to the
investor-whether his is an interstate or an intrastate transaction.
No amount of strict legislation and rigid enforcement
can altogether eliminate the "c" and "d" factors listed above.
Victims, it is unfortunately true, more often than not, find
their civic sense conveniently hidden away in the folds of their
pocketbooks. Once they have been reimbursed in whole or
even in part, their memory always fails them and they become
all too willing to forgive and forget. Strong reasons are sometimes urged why they should accept for their silence restitution of even the most nominal part of that which they have
lost. "Either that or else nothing at all," they are threatened,
and as they were duped in the beginning, so they are in the
end. And this condition obtains whether breach of Federal
or State law is concerned. Such is a characteristic of human
behavior which transcends fine distinctions between the powers of Congress and those of State legislatures.
As to the "d" factor, this likewise works both ways.
States rights protect the crooked promoter and the unscrupulous securities dealers from the heavy hand of Federal agencies,
while he hugs the haven of intrastate exemptions and viceversa he is immune from the enforcement of State laws while
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he rests upon the immunity of transactions exempt from the
State "touch" by reason of these transactions being in interstate commerce.
But by making both State and Federal agencies fully
effective, he is placed squarely between two inescapable fires
and there is no course for him to pursue except that of honest
dealing and adherence to the requirements of both laws.
And that brings us to the consideration of the "a" and
"b" factors in the above list. The first of these refers to the
absence of any legislation in some few states, as has been referred to, and the inadequacy of protective law in others. The
other factor listed as "b" above recites the lack of uniformity
in the securities laws of the various states. This lack of uniformity actually covers as well, however, the absence and
inadequacy which is the subject matter of the first factor.
This is obviously so, because if a standard form of Securities
Act were set up for uniform adoption by all of the states and
the District of Columbia, then it would follow naturally that
at the same time its adoption would be urged to supplant such
inadequate measures as presently appear on the statute books
in some jurisdictions and serve little purpose other than that.
Further, such course would make for the introduction of Blue
Sky legislation in those few states still without any such laws.
True it is that the American Bar Association, through
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws, after seven years of consideration, did adopt a Uniform
Securities Act at the meeting in Memphis in 1929, which was
subsequently approved by the association itself. This was
done only after four drafts of the proposed Act had been made
and after three sessions of the conference had considered it
section by section.
In making its report, the committee acting for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
said:
"The advantages of uniformity in Sale of Securities
Acts, or "Blue Sky Acts" as they are generally called, needs no
argument. In the case of many security issues there is a broad
market extending into many states. All of the states have
acts regulating the sale of securities, but there are wide variations between the statutes in different states * * *. The
principal difficulty has been to facilitate the marketing of
sound securities of unquestionablemerit without burdensome
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formalities while at the same time protecting the public
againstfraud."
The latter statement presents the crux of proper securities regulation. Sometimes, unfortunately, sight is lost of the
importance of keeping legitimate business from extinction in
the zeal of preventing fraudulent enterprise to flourish. More
often, however, the State Securities Commissioner finds himself in the position of not being able to give aid to the honest
securities dealer as issuer, because of the maze of diversified
law in which such applicant finds himself entangled.
In an overwhelming number of instances, however,
much discussion is aroused concerning that portion of the
Blue Sky laws devoted to exemptions from registration. And
although it is not felt that this subject should be neglected
when we clarify the law and make the regulations uniform,
still it is sincerely felt that too much time is now consumed in
attempting to fit "unfittable" sets of facts into exemptions,
from the first not applicable to the circumstances presented.
It is a friendly hint to those who have a desire to cooperate in
the worthwhile task of securities regulation: Stand on your
legal rights, when you are sure of them, and do not view State
securities registration as a badge of shame. If there is doubt
as to a possible exemption, then register; it shows your confidence in the ability of your security to be registered.
But I do not wish to digress here too much from the
problem of uniformity.
It may be frankly and boldly stated here that the American Bar Association has not done all that might be done to
properly carry out "the work so nobly begun." The conclusion of the report of the committee, quoted in part above, is
worded as follows: "The present act (referring to the text
of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act referred to hereinbefore)
has been unanimously approved * * * and is now submitted

to the various states for adoption in the interest of uniformity." Such adoption, however, has not been made the matter
of effort or interest on the part of any committee or agency of
the American Bar Association, and it appears to benefit little
to have a Uniform Act of this character framed without putting it into force. It has lain dormant so long that now in
some respects this excellent work on the part of the Uniform
Law Commissioners has become needful of change and
amendment to make it conform to present-day circumstances.
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The point, however, aside from the need of revising the
uniform law from time to time (no consideration has been
given to it since amendments effected by the conference at its
1930 meeting) is the urgent need of taking measures toward
securing its adoption in all of the states, including those without any present law of such character. This task logically is
one for the American Bar Association, under whose sponsorship this Uniform Law has been created; it is a natural supplement to its work so far done and it is not inconsistent with
work of like nature being presently carried on. For instance
there is a special committee devoted to the work of opposing
the ratification of the Federal Child Labor Amendment by
the legislatures of the states and to urge the adoption in its
stead of adequate State laws. Why not a special committee
to work for the adoption of a Uniform Blue Sky law?
It is to be expected that new problems should arise in
the seven years which have elapsed since the drafting of this
model Act. In that day perhaps the matter of oil interests
was just a faint shadow on the horizon; today it is a consideration of eclipsable proportions. And no one will say that
the vague provision for it in the Uniform Act is to any degree
adequate. Vying equally with it for attention is the matter
of the issuing, offering and sale of the ubiquitous installment
investment trust in its many diversified forms and with its
endless embellishments, and the problem of so-called "investment counsel." Then again there is that troublesome question
mark-the whiskey certificate-ignored entirely by that Uniform Act because the need for giving this question attention
did not then exist. Under section fourteen of the Uniform
Sale of Securities Act there is provision made for the escrow
of promotional stock and for stock issued for intangibles,
which is proper. But the trend today is to go further even
than that and insist upon the impounding of the proceeds
from the sale of the stock offered, until the minimum amount
necessary for successful operation has been riased. Inclusion
of this provision in the Unifrom Act would today constitute
a salutary amendment. We must not be unmindful either of
such conditions as have been altered by the advent of the Federal Securities and Exchange Act and its amendments. This
is particularly so in matters affecting advertising and the circulation of prospecti in the states. In this regard the Uniform
Act as it presently stands is not sufficiently clear and certainly
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not adopted to meet present conditions and possibilities of
conflict between the provisions which may be read into it and
the Federal requirements.
A problem which frequently arises under the state of
things as they presently exist, concerns itself with the selfsame Federal prospectus. This is the official offering literature
of a new issue contemplated to be sold interstate and it is not
to be supposed that the issuer or the underwriter is eager in
addition to it, to prepare a separate circular for use in each of
the individual states.
For instance, it has been the practice for the principal
underwriters to display their names on the cover sheet of the
Federal prospectus. This has been done so universally that
belief has sprung up that this was a requirement of the Securities and Exchange Commission; that it was strictly necessary
that the names of the principal underwriters be printed on the
cover. Dispute arose in instances where the underwriters
whose names appeared in such fashion were not registered or
licensed in some of the states wherein the prospectus was
sought to be circulated and the securities offered.
There was insistence by the states that the names of the
unlicensed underwriters be deleted from the cover page under
the provision in their laws that none but registered dealers
might offer for sale, solicit inquiries about, or deal in securities. This insistence was met with the argument that such
deletion would be contrary to Federal regulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission finally helped to clear the air
by stating that it was not necessary to place on the cover page
the names of the underwriters. It appears to be the better
practice under the circumstances, however, to place the names
of none of the underwriters on the cover, although some
houses prefer to use a separate "jacket" upon which appear
only the names of the underwriters registered in the state in
which such "jacketed" prospectus is proposed to be used.
More often than is pleasant to contemplate this Federal
prospectus innocently involves the issuer or the underwriter
or both in a mare's nest of unexpected trouble, little anticipated by him. This rather full and complete book which is
the Federal prospectus has been zealously worked over by him
and by his accountant, by his attorney and by a host of other
experts. Out of these weeks of tedious effort comes the final
result. He has done his best to make a full disclosure of all
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of the material facts and to hide or conceal nothing. The
requirement of the Securities and Exchange Commission, of
course, is that he should do this. However, in accomplishing
this very thing, he may have barred himself from offering the
security in some State under the provisions of the Blue Sky
law of that particular State.
For instance, to cite an actual example, the registration
statement effective in Washington and the prospectus based
upon it reveals that the promoter, for an investment of three
thousand ($3,000.00) dollars, receives seventy-five per cent
of the voting stock of the company. A million and a quarter
dollars is to be raised from the sale of the stock and this individual, by reason of his control of the common stock, will
control that fund, and his sole investment amounts to only
three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars. Having made a full
disclosure of this arrangement, he confidently goes ahead and
then he meets opposition in his attempt to qualify under the
Blue Sky laws of the states.
It is not argued that he should not be stopped in carrying
out such plan; rather it is believed that such a setup should
be everything but encouraged. Such discouragement is the
function of the State Commissions, as distinguished from the
scope of the Federal Commission. Nevertheless, the legislation under which he is to be prevented from carrying out this
design should be so framed as to warn him, at the very outset,
from attempting such distribution of the common voting
stock as outlined, before he incurs the expense of time, effort
and money in Federal registration. Certainly all of the circumstances for which qualification may be refused cannot be
listed in any one State statute, but possibly the major ones
may be. Take the Pennsylvania law, for instance. The
refusal of the application in the example cited, using the
wording of that Act, would be upon the basis that the commission is not "satisfied that the proposed plan of business of
the applicant is fair, just and equitable."
This stated lack of fairness, justice and equitability in
the proposed plan is cited to cover a whole host of situations,
from lack of adequate working capital to refusals of registration because of failure to come within the terms of the Act.
There is only one other ground for refusal of a new applicant
and that is lack of repute. So often a disappointed applicant
is a puzzled one as well. He knows the commission's decision
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but has difficulty in fathoming the reasons. And the commission all the time has just cause for its action, but is handicapped because the Act is framed in the manner indicated.
Nor is the Uniform Act of any great improvement in
this regard. In Section 8 (i) it is provided as follows:
"If upon examination of any application the Commission shall find that the sale of the security referred to there'in
would not be fraudulent and would not work or tend to
work a fraud upon the purchaser and that the enterprise or
business of the issuer is not based upon unsound business
principles, it shall record the registration * * *."
This provision may have been designed to give the Commissions generous latitude in passing upon securities applications, but it leaves doubt and uncertainty in the minds of anyone who reads it. It would in no degree curtail the latitude of
action if for instance the meaning of "unsound business principles" was amplified. It could be done by listing the chief
examples and then providing for others not specifically defined
or set forth.
Take the matter of selling commissions. This subject
has always been more or less regulated by the State Securities
Commissions. The Pennsylvania Act brands as fraudulent
any transaction in which there is the "gaining, directly or indirectly through the sale of any security, of an underwriting
or promotion fee or profit, so gross and exorbitant as to be
unconscionable" (section 2-f). The Uniform Act as cited
above in section 8 (i) prohibits fraudulent sales of securities
and is it then to be inferred that the bar against fraudulent
sales as outlined in that section extends to sales assumed to be
fraudulent because of unconscionable profit or commission?
It is sometimes pitiful to see an applicant graduate into
a successful S. E. C. registrant only to be "flunked" by the
State commissions because the sales commission makes it impossible to clear the issue in the states. The last remembered
example of this was an issue providing for a commission of
thirty-eight and a half per cent (3 8 Y2 %), and be it said in his
favor that the attorney, when it was pointed out to him, was
apologetically resigned to omitting its offering in the State in
question.
Less pity would be due such an unfortunate had he, in
the first instance, the means available to him of clear information as to the matter of sales commissions and underwriting
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spreads and some sort of notice as to that which under no circumstances would be tolerated; some sort of a warning as to
what would be encountered by him when he presented his
issue for qualification in the states. Of course, too few lawyers, issuers, underwriters and persons generally giv'e anything
but remote second thought to the matter of State securities
requirements and for these, needless to say, little anxiety need
be exercised.
Further upon this question of selling commission, sales
expense and underwriting profit, a factor which is always
considered by State Commissions, an examination of the requirements of the respective states shows, first, a lack of uniformity, and second, in a great number of instances, no
accurate information as to exactly what the limitation or
requisites may be.
The following rough classification will readily show
this. Here is the roster:
STATE RESTRICTIONS AS TO COMMISSIONS AND SALES
EXPENSE
No Blue Sky Law:
Delaware, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Nevada, District of
Columbia.
No Specific Provision in the Law:
Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana (by uniform rule, oil and mining securities 20%, industrial issues 15%, bank and insurance
shares 10%), Maine, Massachusetts (none, except exorbitant commission or profit makes sale fraudulent), New Hampshire, Ohio
(none, except "qualification when selling cost is moderate, e. g.
10%"), Oregon, Pennsylvania (none, except exorbitant commission or profit makes sale fraudulent), South Dakota, Texas (none,
but application must show commissions paid, whether in stock or
cash), Washington, Wyoming (none, but regulation requires commissions to be paid upon actual cash received and not upon subscriptions taken).
Maximum Amount Made Discretionary with Securities Commission:
Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico (discretionary, but prohibits commissions paid to officers and directors), Oklahoma, Utah, Montana, Wisconsin (discretionary, but
under such discretionary power, maximum is fixed at 10%).
10% Maximum:
Kansas (including all sales expense), North Carolina (10% of
sale price).
121 2 % Maximum:
Nebraska (1 212% including all sales expense).
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15 % Maximum:
Alabama (generally 15%, but bank and insurance companies 10%.
finance and mortgage companies 10%), North Dakota (no commissions to be paid salesmen until cash is received).
20% Maximum:
California (generally 20%, building and loan companies 10%, finance arid mortgage companies 10%, industrial companies 10o,
royalty companies 15%, prospective public utilities 10%, holding
companies for stock of insurance companies 15%), Florida (company must receive 80% of proceeds of sale), Iowa (20% of sales
price), Kentucky (unlawful to pay or receive more than 20%0 commission), Michigan (20% including all sales expense), Mississippi
(20% including all sales expense), Tennessee (company must receive 80%0 of proceeds of sale), West Virginia (20% of sales price
including all sales expense).
25% Maximum:
Georgia (company must receive 75% of proceeds of sale), Montana (25%o of sales price).
30% Maximum:
Virginia (law provides 20%, which can be extended to 30% by
commission).

So we can readily see that if any general distribution of
securities is sought the issuer or distributor is placed in a state
of most uncomfortable perplexity in arriving at what should
be the proper commission to be fixed, so as to conform to the
respective State requirements.
At a glance this convinces one that if there is to be a limitation of the percentage to be charged for selling cost, it then
should not vary with the geographical locations of the states
or in some like arbitrary fashion. It is equally as important
that the investor in Texas be fairly dealt with as it is for the
securities purchaser in Minnesota. And it is only proper that
the securities seller shall have the means of handily available
knowledge as to what he may and what he may not charge.
Such allowance should be fair to him and primarily fair to the
investor. The best arrangement, it appears, is to have it
scaled to meet the peculiar conditions applicable to particular
classes of investments as provided for by Louisiana, as shown
above.
Uniformity in the law itself will go far in aiding meritorious investment business and at the same time will permit
the prevention of fraudulent practices and injury to the in-
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vestor by dishonest undertaking. However, there is need, in
addition, for uniformity in regulations of the states, in forms
and procedure. The purpose of all legislation in this field is
the same, namely, to protect the investor, and there can be seen
no deviation from devotion to that purpose by making requirements in all of the states similar. Selfishly, there may be
some states which yet feel that by making the rules less stringent, they may attract business that otherwise would center in
other states. But, naturally, such view is obviously shortsighted, to say the least, because it is the resident of their own
home state that eventually pays for such laxity, and more
often than not, pays and pays through the nose.
However, much of what I have said concerns not so
much the matter of uniformity and clarification of the law
as it possibly does the standardization of rules and procedure.
Certainly the matter of selling commission and underwriting
fees could well be made the subject of commission rules. Interpretation of the phrase "sound business principle" might
even be made the subject of some agreed more or less standard
definition. So, if uniformity can be accomplished by making
plain and understandable the requirements of the State Securities Commissions by standardizing their rules instead of or as
well as their laws, let that be done as well. It is strongly felt,
however, that the first step should be in the uniformity of the
law. First, because this being the basis of any regulation or
ruling, its perfection should therefore be first; secondly, because this work has already been started and it presently needs
but to be carried on and, what is more, carried into effect by
urging the legislatures of the states to act.
There is a willingness on the part of Securities Commissioners everywhere to do this service for the aid of that part of
the securities profession which is committed to the principles
of honesty and fair dealing. There should be allowed no false
idea that it is the desire of those charged with administration
of this most important field of the law, to leave in state of
vague confusion and hazy doubt, the law which it is their
duty to enforce.
The Securities Commissioner has an abhorrence of "red
tape" and delay, and therefore will welcome, I know, any
effort toward making the law uniform. Let the lawyer and
the American Bar Association do their share!

